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WAYNE STERLING PEARSON 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 19053 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of the offenses of Attempted 
Robbery and Attempted Burglary before the Honorable David B. 
Dee, a Judge of the Third Judicial District. Appellant was 
sentenced to the indeterminate term as provided by law of 
not more than 5 years on each such offense to run concurrently 
with the offense to which he is presently incarcerated. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a 
term as provided by law, of not more than 5 years for each 
offense to run concurrently with the offense with which he 
is presently incarcerated. 
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Appellant seeks reversal ot the judqtrrent lenuccrted ur llr 
the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was tried on the offenses of Attempted Burglary 
and Attempted Robbery, both third degree felonies. The 
allegation was that he, along with Robert Steven Smith and 
Mike N. Pappadakis, attempted to burglarize and rob Udell J. 
and Myra Kuhre, in Salt Lake County, on the 15th of October, 
1981. The evidence indicated that two juveniles, Brian Scott 
Moss and Anthony Gilbert Sisneros, were solicited by Robert 
Steven Smith to go to the house of the Kuhres where they would 
enter and steal property of value including jewelry (T. Vol II 
pg 84). On October 15th, the juveniles were picked up by Robert 
Steven Smith and driven to the gas station owned by Mike N. 
Pappadakis (T. Vol III pg 8). At that location they were 
joined by Wayne Sterling Pearson, appellant herein. A conver-
sation took place and Pearson provided gloves and tape which 
would allegedly be used in the course of committing the 
offense (T. Vol III pg 25). They then drove to the residence 
of Brian Scott Moss, one of the juveniles, for the alleged 
purpose of securing a mask for use in the robbery (T. Vol III 
pg 29). 
The four individuals, Smith, Sisneros, Moss and Pearson 
'I"'' <Jrove to the residence of Pearson's brother in Salt Lake 
'uunty, at 2808 South 200 East (T. Vol III pg 37). Pearson 
exited the vehicle and went into his brother's house. Dur-
ing the few minutes, in which the other individuals remained 
in the automobile, a detective from South Salt Lake Police 
Department became suspicious and began an investigation. 
Pearson left his brother's home and reentered the car. The 
allegation was that at this point he provided a toy pistol 
to the juveniles. The car began to move down the street a few 
feet where it was stopped by the police. The suspicions 
of the police were aroused by the fact that, during school 
time, two of these two juveniles were in the automobile. 
(T. Vol V pg 22-25). 
All the individuals were taken to the South Salt Lake 
Police Department and were interrogated. After an inter-
rogation at the South Salt Lake Police Department, a business 
card from the Pappadakis service station was discovered with 
a fingerprint from Pearson and the address of the Kuhre's 
home at 1909 East 5150 South, Salt Lake County. The juveniles 
were released to their parents. Further interrogation of 
the two adults including the appellant herein, was conducted. 
I'he police became suspicious after having discovered gloves, 
t a woman's stocking and a business card (T. Vol IV 
pa dOb-208) that the four individuals had been planning an illegal 
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offense. The two juveniles were then recalled back to the 
police station where further interrogation took placL. 
Upon this reinterrogation, the police learned, froni 
the statements of the juveniles that they had been solicited 
to commit the burglary and robbery. However, the juveniles 
did not know the name and address of the person they were to 
rob other than it was an elderly lady who lived on the east 
side of Salt Lake County. The card, with the address on it, 
led them to Kuhre's residence where they learned that 
the house cleaner was connected to an employee of Mike 
Pappadakis. There was no evidence that the Kuhres were at 
their home at or around the time of this incident and the 
juveniles were unaware whether Smith in leaving Pearson's 
brother's home, was headed directly to the Kuhres or planned 
any intervening activity. 
In addition the evidence was conflicting regarding the 
assent by the juveniles to the commission of the offense. 
Witness Moss maintained he had been expressing doubt to the 
defendants that he was sure whether he wanted to participate 
in the burglary, (Vol II pgs 22, 38, 98-100), and testified 
about witness Sisneros reluctance. 
ARGUMEJJT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE OFFENSES OF 
-6-
/,TT EMPTED BURGLARY AND ATTEMPTED ROBBERY. 
It is appellant's contention that the evidence, if true, 
tailed to establish the commission of the offenses of attempted 
robbery and attempted burglary. The actions of appellant 
did not constitute an attempt to commit an offense both as 
defined by the criminal code and as analyzed by the case 
law in relation to the facts of this case. The best the 
evidence was able to show was that preparations were made to 
commit a theft from the Kuhres. Because the theft was to 
take place at their home we can assume that it was necessary 
to commit at least a burglary to secure the property desired. 
The evidence further showed that preparations were made to com-
mit a robbery if necessary. It may even be assumed that the 
participants in this offense anticipated that somebody would 
be home and consequently the conunisson of a robbery necessary 
to secure the property desired. However, no evidence was 
offered which would indicate that the Kuhres were home 
around the time of the incident at the appellant's brother's 
apartment. Consequently, the best the evidence was able to 
show is a conspiracy among these participants to commit a 
burglary and contingently a robbery. The participants had 
committed a conspiracy and were engaging in overt acts in 
furtherance of conspiracy. 
A distinction needs to be made between an overt act in 
relation to a conspiracy and an overt act which amounts to 
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an attempt. A conspiratorial overt act need not i:lmount to 
an attempt. However, an attempt must be sornetlnnci more thdn 
preparation, planning or gathering of the devices tu be usecl 
in the offense. An overt act in relation to a conspiracy, 
may be in itself an innocent action although it is in the 
nature of preparation or planning for commission of the 
ultimate offense. An action, in relation to an attempt, 
cannot not be an innocent action or, standing alone, unequi vocai 
as an action in committing an offense. One may buy a weapon 
for any number of legal purposes. Such a purchase, in rela-
tion to a conspiracy, may be an overt act and as such be 
used in making a case for conspiracy to commit murder. 
However, the purchase of a weapon, al though in preparation 
for the commission of a murder may not be used as the basis 
for making the case for attempted murder because such action 
does not constitute the unequivocal step needed to show 
that the crime is being attempted. If the perpetrator 
of the attempted murder pointed the weapon or fired the weapon 
in such a way as all reasonable doubt would be eliminated 
that he was firing at a particular person, this would then 
constitute attempted murder. 
The problem revolves around the definition of an 
attempt as used in the Utah Code. 77-4-101, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), defines an attempt as 
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' ... conduct constituting a substantial step towards corrunission 
lhe offense". The phrase seemingly includes any action how-
removed which might be viewed as activity in relation to 
<:011uni tting the offense. However, appellant would urge the 
Court to add the proper emphasis to the words substantial 
and commission. 
There is a distinction between an attempt and preparation 
to corrunit the offense. As stated in People vs. Miller, 
42 P.2d 308 (Cal. 1935), "where the crime remains unfinished 
and the defendant is charged with attempt, two important 
elements are essential: A specific intent to corrunit the 
crime and a direct and ineffectual act done towards its 
corrunission. Mere intention to corrunit a specific crime does 
not amount to an attempt. Preparation alone is not sufficient. 
Something more is required than menaces, preparation or 
planning." at page 309. 
Citing Whartons On Criminal Law (12th Edition. Volume 1, 
Page 280) the California Court quotes: 
"If the preparation is not in itself indictable or 
will not of itself, if not interrupted extraneously 
result in crime, the weight of reasoning is that it 
cannot be made per se indictable as an attempt. For, 
first, there is not evidence as a general rule, that 
can prove that a particular preparation was designed 
for a particular end. Thus, a gun may be bought as 
well for hunting as for homicide. Nor can we lay down 
any intelligible line between preparations which be-
tray more clearly than those which betray less clearly 
a felonious purpose. Secondly, between preparation 
and execution there is a gap which criminal jurisprudence 
_g_ 
cannot fill up so as to make one continuous offense. 
There may be a change of purpose, or the vreparation may 
be a vague precautionary measure, to which the law 
cannot append a positive criminal intent, reacly lu ripu, 
into guilty act." at page 309. 
In People vs. Anderson, 37 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1934), the 
defendant had gone to a movie theater for the purposes of 
robbing it. On lifting his revolver to point it at the 
cashier it accidentally discharged killing the employee. 
The defendant was charged with felony murder but contended 
that the best the evidence showed was that he merely intended 
to corrunit a robbery but fell short of actually attempting 
the robbery and consequently it was not a felony murder. 
The Court concluded: 
"Defendant's conduct in concealing the gun on his 
person and going to the general vicinity of the 
Curran Theater with intent to corrunit robbery may, 
for present purposes, be classified as mere 
acts of preparation. But, when he walked into the 
theater, about two feet from the grill and pulled 
out the gun and was going to put it in the cage 
when it went off, we a re satisfied that his con-
duct passed far beyond the prepatory stage and con-
stituted direct and positive overt acts that would 
have reasonably tended toward the perpetration of 
the robbery had the gun not exploded, for one 
reason or another and frustrated the plan to 
consurrunate the offense." at page 68. 
Appellant would contend that a distinction between 
preparation and acts directed towards the direct corrunission 
of the offense which would constitute an attempt must be 
made. "There must be some appreciable fragment of the crime 
corrunitted, and it must be in such progress that it will be 
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·onsummated unless interrupted by circumstances independent 
.i t he wi 11 of the person at tempting it." 14 Cal Jur 2nd, 
."-c.:ction 27. In short, preparation is tied to conspiracy 
while an attempt must be connected to the actual conunission 
of the offense. 
No act was done in terms of conunitting the burglary. 
A burglary requires an unlawful entry with the purpose of 
conunitting a felony or theft, refer 76-6-202, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). The best the evidence showed 
was that the parties intended to conunit a burglary and con-
spired in that regard. They did not enter or do any act which 
would have resulted in an entry. They were not on the property 
nor was there evidence that indicated that their next step 
was the house to be burglarized. 
The evidence is further removed regarding the attempted 
robbery which requires " ... the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in possession of another from his 
person or inunediate presence against his will accomplished by 
means of force or fear." Refer 76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953, as amended). The best the evidence showed was that the 
parties were prepared to conunit a robbery, if in fact there 
were people at home at the time they intended to enter and 
steal. 
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The defendant conspired to commit a robbery and their 
actions were overt acts directed towards the furtherance 
of that conspiracy but, no action was taken to attempt a 
robbery. No victim was detained or confronted. No force 
or fear used to any degree. The defendants were miles 
from the location of the planned offense. There was even 
doubt as to whether the juveniles, who were to commit the 
offense, were in agreement with the defendants about its 
commission. 
This is not to say that a distinction between preparation 
and attempt is a distinct line, as recognized in U.S. vs. 
Judith Coplon, 185 F.2nd 629 (2nd Cir. 1950). In the Coplon 
case the defendant had left Washington, D.C., for New York 
with documents which she was prepared to hand over to a 
foreign agent. While waiting in the New York Airport with thosE 
documents she was arrested and charged with attempted espionage. 
The Circuit Court, recognizing the distinction between 
preparation and an attempt, concluded that, in this matter, 
her acts, which put her one step removed from the actual 
completion of the offense, i.e. handing over the documents to 
the foreign agent, constituted an attempt. 
Logically, the Circuit Court reasoned, an attempt must 
include at least part of the commission of the offense. But, 
where the offense is such that any act of commission completes 
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the offense the conclusion is either that there is no 
'"t l cnipt" in relation to that crime or acts of preparation 
,,,. closely related to the offense that such acts become 
ari attempt. In the Coplon case, she had traveled to New 
York for the purpose of meeting her connection. She had 
in her possession the documents and was about to turn them 
over. If nothing else, she was at least at the location 
where the offense was to be committed. 
A recent decision of this Court further explains the 
nexus needed between an action as it ripens into an attempt 
to commit an offense. In State of Utah vs. William w. 
Castonguay, filed May 9, 1983, the defendant was charged with 
attempted homicide. The evidence was that shots had been 
fired by the defendant. It was the State's contention 
that those shots were fired in an attempt to murder a police 
officer. As stated by this Court, one of the pivotal 
questions in that case was whether the defendant's conduct 
disclosed a concious deliberate preparation, "which was foiled 
only through some extraneous interference and not through a 
volitional act or omission on the part of the defendant." 
at page 3. This Court concluded, citing State v. Lamm, 
606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280 
(N.M. 1979) and State v. Whittinghill, 163 P.2d, 342 (Utah 
L945), "All the circumstances, when taken together, must admit 
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of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of yuilt tu 
warrant conviction." at page 4. Where there was a conil1cl 
in the evidence even regarding whether the would 
perform the acts requested and a question regarding what 
further actions were to be taken by the defendant even before 
approaching the property to be burglarized it is clear that 
an attempt was far removed from what had already been accom-
plished. Couple that with the questions raised regarding 
the robbery in that preparations in that regard were contingent 
and speculative and it is apparent that no attempt had been 
accomplished. 
CONCLUSION 
The best the evidence showed was that the defendant had 
conspired to commit a burglary and/or robbery and had pre-
pared and engaged in actions of preparation prior to its 
commission. No attempt had been accomplished because no 
action had been taken which was a substantial step towards 
the commission of those offenses and consequently the charges 
of attempted burglary and robbery were premature. 
, .... 
DATED this ____;j___ day of 
RESPECTFULL! SUBMITTED, 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
1983. 
Attorney for Defendant Pearson 
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